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Abstract: Mozambique’s post-conflict development has recently focused on the 
promise of biofuels production, and the Government of Mozambique has accord-
ingly made hundreds of agricultural concessions to foreign and domestic cor-
porations since 2006. In response, local groups have sought community land 
grants to protect livelihoods. We seek to understand whether the magnitude and 
recentness of violent events during Mozambique’s 16-year civil war determined 
the success of communities’ efforts to secure lands. We hypothesize that violence 
weakens the ability of communities to protect their traditional land uses from 
concessions by lobbying for community land grants. This hypothesis – dubbed 
the “weak institutions hypothesis” – is contrasted with the idea that violence gal-
vanizes political participation. We test the hypothesis using GIS-generated data 
at the district level on recognized community landholdings and civil war events. 
Controlling for factors such as market access, road distance to grain warehouses, 
and spatial auto-correlation, we find that more intense violence is possibly (but 
not significantly) associated with more land grants, and that districts experienc-
ing more recent violence are actually more likely to lobby successfully for land 
grants – lending support to the idea that violence boosts community use of risk-
pooling institutions.
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1  Introduction
Does the violence of war depress the ability of communities to influence post-con-
flict development policy effectively, thereby dooming the most conflict-affected 
areas to bear the brunt of the costs of future development? Or, on the other hand, 
do the communities who suffered most in the war, whether because it generates 
greater internal social cohesion or heightened general political participation 
rates, enjoy an enhanced ability to shape the implementation of future devel-
opment policy? The answers will bear on the important issue rebuilding post-
war political institutions (Sambanis, 2002): if the former scenario is the case, we 
might expect the dynamics of the war may be reproduced without some purpose-
ful intervention. If the latter scenario is the case, we might tentatively conclude 
that war sews the seeds of its own autonomous recovery in some way (see, e.g., 
Weinstein, 2005).
This paper analyzes a cross-sectional, GIS-generated dataset designed to 
capture the spatial effects of violence on the distribution of agricultural land con-
cessions to corporations at the district level in Mozambique. Mozambique has 
made tremendous development strides since the termination of its 16-year civil 
war in the early 1990s. Since 2006, the Government of Mozambique (GoM) has 
controversially begun according land concessions to biofuels corporations foreign 
and domestic (Schut, Slingerland, & Locke, 2010) – a land use that competes with 
local agriculture, which tends to focus on food production (Deininger, et al., 2011, 
Estabrook, 2011). The resulting concern over food security has prompted some 
international NGOs to cry foul (Oxfam International, 2007), and motivated many 
local communities to oppose the concessions and press the government to rec-
ognize their claims to the land with community land grants (see Deininger, et 
al., 2011, p. 189). Assuming that all communities wish to secure lands in their 
districts, we exploit the spatial variation in the distribution of community land 
grants to assess the effects of wartime violence on the effectiveness of local politi-
cal mobilization.
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2  Background: The Debate
We hypothesize that violence weakens the ability of communities to oppose the 
redistribution of land from traditional to industrial uses via concessions. This 
hypothesis – dubbed the “weak institutions hypothesis” – is contrasted with the 
idea that violence galvanizes political participation. Many scholars contend that 
civil wars in developing nations can precipitate (and result from) the degeneration 
and/or perversion of national-level governance institutions needed for long-term 
development and accountability (Collier, et al., 2003, Humphreys, 2005, p. 512, 
Reno, 1997, 1999, 2003) – particularly when weak governments receive outside 
support and are therefore unaccountable to the tax-paying public (Humphreys, 
2003, p. 13). At the micro level, Brück (2003) argues that certain household char-
acteristics – for instance, being headed by a woman – effectively limit land access 
in Mozambique, and that war heightens the magnitude of those effects. At the 
individual level, exposure to civil war is a significant predictor of future violent 
behavior (Miguel, Saiegh, & Satyanath, 2011), which may erode social cohesion 
and thereby the effectiveness of community institutions.
Conversely, some evidence suggests that the adverse effects of wartime vio-
lence on local economic growth tend not to persist, due to “rebound effects” 
(Davis & Weinstein, 2002). Bellows and Miguel (2008) argue that measures of 
local political mobilization, like community meeting attendance, memberships 
in local political groups, and voting, are higher in Sierra Leonean households 
that directly experienced more intense violence than those that experienced less 
or none. On the other hand, political mobilization at the individual level does 
not necessarily proxy well for the effectiveness, transparency, or inclusiveness of 
local institutions, and there is some evidence that violent conflict may provoke 
negative coping mechanisms in local institutions, resulting in the exclusion or 
even persecution of certain sub-populations (Krause, 2010).
Stated succinctly then, in our context, the “weak institutions” hypothesis 
(HWI) we test is: The greater the intensity of violence that occurred within a district, 
the smaller the total area of community land grants will be.
3  Empirical Strategy
We employed a cross-sectional, district-level dataset with 142 observations, 
which include all rural and major metropolitan districts. The sources of the data 
vary and are noted below, but special mention is made of the Domingues (2011) 
dataset on Mozambican war events, which exclusively informs the war-related 
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predictor variables. The latter include the indices for battle intensity, and rebel 
and government troop presences, which were created by assigning a value of 2 to 
battles or the establishment of rebel/ government headquarters, 1 to the occur-
rence of “one-sided” violence or reports of troop movements and encampments, 
and then summing the scores for all events in that district. The outcome variable 
– community land grant area awarded in kilometers – is derived from the World 
Bank report by Deininger et al. (2011) and a geographic information system (GIS) 
shapefile that informed that report. The mean area of community land grants 
awarded is about 500 km2 per district, but the distribution is heavily left skewed 
(skewness = 3.7), with the median at zero, and even the 75th percentile about half 
the mean, at 225 km2. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of community land 
grants. All data were generated in a GIS using ArcGIS software.1
In order to test the “weak institutions” hypothesis, we distinguish between 
districts in which violence took place on the one hand, and districts that hosted or 
otherwise supported rebel and government forces on the other (which we control 
for separately). Many control variables are also included in the dataset, most of 
which – such as distance by road to the nearest city, distance to the nearest grain 
warehouse, and spatial autocorrelation corrections – were generated in a GIS.
1  A codebook is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Figure 1: Histogram illustrating the distribution of community land grants.
Wartime Violence and Post-Conflict Political Mobilization   5
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics of the outcome and primary predictor 
variables. The outcome variable’s distribution is heavily skewed, it includes an 
abundance of zeros, and its variance is greater than the mean, suggesting our use 
of a negative binomial GLM with a log link.
Following Ver Hoeff and Boveng (2007), the outcome variable is denoted as 
exhibiting a negative binomial (NB) distribution as Y~NB(μ,κ), parameterized 
such that
E(Y)=μ
var(Y)=νNB (μ)=μ+κμ2,  (1)
where μ is the mean of the distribution, κ is a dispersion parameter, and μ>0 and 
κ>0. The relationship between E(Yi), the expected number square kilometers of 
community land grants in district , and , the intensity of violence in district i, in a 
NB model can be expressed
E(Yi ) = μi = exp(β0 + αHWISCOREi + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 + ... + βqXiq + εi),   (2)
where and are regression coefficients, and are control variables.
Control variables, listed in Table 2, included in the dataset were mostly 
generated in a GIS, and include demographic (i.e., rural population density), 
geographic (e.g., total length of major rivers within a district), and market 
access (e.g., distance to the nearest grain warehouse) attributes. Distances were 
Statistic Community Land Grants Logged Battle Intensity
Average Time Since 
War’s Start
p5 0 0 0
p25 0 0 0
p50 0 1.098612 7.235
p75 224.9 2.079442 10.21
p95 3027.1 2.995732 12
mean 500.7507 1.236719 5.766549
variance 1837787 1.25554 23.23976
min 0 0 -1.17
max 8479.6 4.077538 13.39
skewness 3.710675 0.3497726 -0.16741
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for area of community land grants (Km2), logged battle intensity, 
and average time (in years) elapsed from war’s beginning to violence in that district.
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Name Description Source
LnDistKm2 Natural log of district 
surface area in Km2
MIT GIS File: 1314153131_mz_f7districts_2002.
shp
PopUrb Urban population http://www.citypopulation.de/ 
PopRur Total rural population MIT GIS File: 1314154139_mz_a1villages_2007.
shp
PopDensR Rural population density 
(people/ Km2)
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_
a1villages_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp
TotPop Total population of the 
district
MIT GIS File: 1314154139_mz_a1villages_2007.
shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
PopDens Total population density 
(people/ Km2)
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1villa-
ges_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
FloodKm2 Area (Km2) of the district in 
the flood plain
MIT GIS Files: 1314153329_mz_c32flood_1999.
shp1, 1314153131_mz_f7districts_2002.shp
FloodPerc Percentage of district in 
the flood plain
MIT GIS Files: 1314153329_mz_c32flood_1999.
shp, 1314153131_mz_f7districts_2002.shp
RivLen Cumulative length (Km) of 
rivers passing through the 
district
MIT GIS Files: 1316561501_mz_p53rivers_1999.
shp2, 1314153131_mz_f7districts_2002.shp
Twns5k Number of towns and 
cities over 5k inhabitants
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1villa-
ges_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
CityFID FID of the nearest city over 
50k inhabitants
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_
a1villages_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp3;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
CityDist Distance (Km) from cen-
troid to nearest city
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1villa-
ges_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
CityRoute “[Origin] – [Destination]” 
of route to nearest city by 
road
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1villa-
ges_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/;
TimeByRd Time (hours) it takes by 
road to reach the nearest 
city >50k from district 
centroid4
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1vil-
lages_2007.shp, 1314154033_mz_
p2roads_2002.shp5, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
Table 2: continued
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calculated by way of a road network analysis, taking the centroid of the district as 
the point of departure to any given destination. Spatial autocorrelation was also 
controlled for by way of an inverse distance-weighted matrix of community land 
grant magnitudes.
DistByRd Distance (Km) by road to 
the nearest city >50k from 
district centroid
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1vil-
lages_2007.shp, 1314154033_mz_
p2roads_2002.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
WHFID FID number of nearest 
food warehouse
MIT GIS Files: 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp,
1314153361_mz_g17warehouses_1999.shp
WHDist Distance (Km) from district 
centroid to nearest food 
warehouse
MIT GIS Files: 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp,
1314153361_mz_g17warehouses_1999.shp
CapDist Distance (Km) from district 
centroid to capital city 
(Maputo)
MIT GIS Files: 1314154139_mz_a1villa-
ges_2007.shp, 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp;
http://www.citypopulation.de/
NGOFID FID number of nearest 
NGO field office
MIT GIS Files: 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp,
1314153540_mz_e624ngos_2004.shp
NGODist Distance (Km) from district 
centroid to nearest NGO 
field office
MIT GIS Files: 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp,
1314153540_mz_e624ngos_2004.shp6
WFPFID FID number of nearest 
World Food Programme 
(WFP) office
MIT GIS Files: 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp,
1314154113_mz_e624unwfp_1999.shp7
WFPDist Distance (Km) from district 
centroid to nearest WFP 
office
MIT GIS Files: 1314153131_mz_f7dis-
tricts_2002.shp,
1314154113_mz_e624unwfp_1999.shp
Table 2: Control variables by name, description, and source.
1. “Mozambique (Flood Region, 1999)”, created 11 February 1999.
2. “Mozambique (Major Rivers, 1999)”, created 30 January 1999.
3. Centroids were created for each district, which serve as the basis for all distance measurements to follow.
4. Using a network analysis, assuming that highways allow for speeds of 90 Km/hr, primary roads 65 Km/hr, 
and dirt paths 35 Km/hr.
5. “Mozambique (Roads, 2002)”, created 12 March 2002.
6. “Mozambique (NGO Offices, 2004)”, created 14 September 2004.
7. “Mozambique (UN World Food Program (WFP) Offices, 1999)”, created 1 January 1999.
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4  Results
Table 2 reports the results. Uncontrolled models include only those variables that 
are visible in the table. Controlled models also include those described above 
and in Table 2. In models 1-4, the extent that a district suffered wartime violence 
is an extremely significant, positive predictor of community land grant awards. 
Moreover, when a time dimension is tested for in models 2 and 4, the recentness 
of violence also is an extremely significant, positive predictor of community land 
grant awards. Both of these findings possibly suggest that violence does indeed 
galvanize, rather than undermine, community political mobilization. In con-
trolled regressions, however, only in the model that includes the time variable but 
excludes all alternative hypothesis variables (column 6) does wartime violence 
continue to be a significant, positive predictor of community land grants, though 
the coefficient never dips into negative territory. Overall, wartime violence seems 
to have a neutral, or possibly positive, effect on the formation of community land 
grants, suggesting that our initial hypothesis should be rejected.
The recentness of violence seems to be more unequivocal in its effects, 
improving a district’s efforts at mobilization for community lands across the 
board. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon: heavily and recently conflict-affected 
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
A
re
a 
of
 C
om
m
un
ity
 L
an
d 
G
ra
nt
s 
(K
m
2)
0 5 10 15
Avg. Years Since War's Start
Low Battle Intensity
Medium Battle Intensity
High Battle Intensity
Figure 2: Adjusted predictions of community land grants in Km2 by average years since vio-
lence, by low (5th %ile), medium (50th %ile) and high (95th %ile) battle intensity. Based on 
Model 8. Source: The authors, based on Model 2(8).
Wartime Violence and Post-Conflict Political Mobilization   9
 
Un
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
M
od
el
s
Co
nt
ro
lle
d 
M
od
el
s
LA
BE
LS
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Lo
g 
Ba
ttl
e I
nt
en
si
ty
 S
co
re
0.
32
2*
**
 
(0
.0
72
0)
0.
47
6*
**
 
(0
.1
18
)
0.
37
8*
**
 
(0
.0
77
5)
0.
55
7*
**
 
(0
.1
31
)
0.
00
40
1 
(0
.1
31
)
0.
31
0*
 
(0
.1
79
)
0.
00
15
2 
(0
.1
39
)
0.
26
5 
(0
.1
89
)
Lo
g 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t T
ro
op
 P
re
se
nc
es
 In
de
x
-1
.3
42
**
* 
(0
.4
51
)
-1
.4
07
 
(1
.1
04
)
-0
.0
25
7 
(0
.6
07
)
-4
.2
66
**
* 
(1
.3
49
)
Lo
g 
Re
be
l P
re
se
nc
es
 In
de
x
-0
.2
16
 
(0
.1
83
)
-0
.7
57
 
(0
.5
15
)
0.
04
44
 
(0
.2
17
)
0.
62
2 
(0
.6
33
)
Ye
ar
s S
in
ce
 W
ar
‘s 
Be
gi
nn
in
g 
(B
at
tle
s)
-0
.0
47
9*
 
(0
.0
27
4)
-0
.0
53
6*
 
(0
.0
29
0)
-0
.1
03
**
* 
(0
.0
38
9)
-0
.0
99
6*
**
 
(0
.0
38
4)
Ye
ar
s S
in
ce
 W
ar
‘s 
Be
gi
nn
in
g 
(G
ov
‘t 
Pr
es
en
ce
s)
0.
02
90
 
(0
.0
88
1)
0.
32
5*
**
 
(0
.1
09
)
Ye
ar
s S
in
ce
 W
ar
‘s 
Be
gi
nn
in
g 
(R
eb
el
 
Pr
es
en
ce
s)
0.
09
30
 
(0
.0
85
4)
-0
.0
89
8 
(0
.1
02
)
Co
ns
ta
nt
4.
87
1*
**
 
(0
.1
23
)
4.
94
5*
**
 
(0
.1
34
)
4.
88
6*
**
 
(0
.1
23
)
4.
94
6*
**
 
(0
.1
36
)
7.
41
5*
 
(4
.1
37
)
6.
72
2 
(4
.1
81
)
7.
34
1*
 
(4
.1
59
)
6.
69
3 
(4
.1
51
)
Ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
14
2
14
2
14
2
14
2
14
2
14
2
14
2
14
2
De
gr
ee
s o
f f
re
ed
om
14
0
13
9
13
8
13
5
12
2
12
1
12
0
11
7
AI
C
12
.5
7
12
.5
6
12
.5
4
12
.5
4
11
.7
2
11
.6
9
11
.7
5
11
.6
7
Lo
g 
lik
el
ih
oo
d
-8
90
.5
-8
89
.0
-8
86
.1
-8
83
.3
-8
12
.3
-8
08
.8
-8
12
.3
-8
03
.8
St
an
da
rd
 er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
**
* p
<0
.0
1,
 **
 p
<0
.0
5,
 * 
p<
0.
1
Ta
bl
e 3
: U
nc
on
tro
lle
d 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
ne
ga
tiv
e b
in
om
ia
l l
og
-li
nk
 m
od
el
s p
re
di
ct
in
g 
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
10   Topher McDougal and Raul Caruso 
districts fare the best in obtaining land grants, while districts that were lightly 
affected by conflict long ago fare the worst in terms of securing their communal 
claims to land. The fact that the adjusted predictions “fan out” as the violence 
occurred more recently suggests that the effects of violence on the demand for 
community land grants fades over time.
Finally, note that the presence of government troops in a district negative and 
significant effect on the level of community land grants awarded.
5  Discussion
As noted above, Bellows and Miguel (2008) argue that exposure to wartime vio-
lence actually galvanized collective action in postwar Sierra Leone. If a similar 
mechanism is at work here, we might speculate that violence bolstered commu-
nity cohesion in Mozambique (and that these effects fade with time). One might 
postulate that efforts to secure communal lands represent a manifestation of 
a demand for risk-pooling mechanisms in the wake of insecurity, and that this 
demand for risk-pooling declines as the environment becomes less turbulent and 
the inefficiencies of collective property no longer outweigh the risks of private 
property (see, e.g., Demsetz, 1967, Ellickson, 1993). The effect of government troop 
presence might corroborate this reading: districts that supported government 
troops may be rewarded during and after the war. That support might decrease 
the need of local communities to depend on risk-pooling mechanisms.
However, it is worth noting one of this study’s results presented elsewhere 
(McDougal & Caruso, 2012): the ability of communities to oppose the local agri-
cultural concessions successfully increases with recentness of violence in accord-
ance with Bellows’ and Miguel’s political participation mechanism, but it seems 
to remain flat or even decrease with intensity of violence. That is, districts that 
experienced elevated levels of violence during the war tend to have similar or 
larger areas allocated by government as corporate biofuels concessions. These 
two findings considered jointly, high intensity violence may boost the use of risk-
pooling institutions, such as communally-governed lands, but possibly weaken 
the effectiveness of communities in negotiating with central government.
Our findings may suggest that post-war Mozambican communities are more 
self-reliant, but also more politically isolated. Why would violence bolster com-
munity solidarity on the one hand and impair community effectiveness on the 
other? This speculative claim may imply that war-affected Mozambican districts 
have fewer political connections to government. Such an interpretation reso-
nates, for example, with the claims of Woolcock (1998) that while “horizontal” 
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social capital (bond between and within local communities) increases commu-
nity self-reliance, “vertical” social capital (local ties to higher levels of govern-
ance) are critical for successful community development. Violence might plau-
sibly have bolstered the former, while damaging the latter. This conclusion may 
represent a middle ground between those who bemoan the effects of violence on 
local institutions, and those (like Bellows and Miguel) who note its beneficial 
effects. The primary contribution of this study, then, is the insight that violence 
may have positive effects on certain forms of community institutions, and nega-
tive forms on others.
For policymakers, our findings may suggest that attempts at promoting post-
conflict community development might well be anchored in those local com-
munity-level institutions that adapted to the wartime violence in the first place. 
Moreover, building links between government and these possibly new forms of 
community organization may be an important safeguard against political exclu-
sion and exploitative development scenarios in the post-war period. Finally, 
engaging these local institutions as early as possible may be particularly impor-
tant, as war’s effects on the political effectiveness of local communities seem to 
fade over time.
References
Bellows, J., & Miguel, E., (2008), War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone, Journal of 
Public Economics, vol. 93, no. 11-12, pp. 1144-1157.
Brück, T., (2003), Coping Strategies in Post-War Rural Mozambique, 384, Berlin: German 
Institute for Economic Research.
Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & Sambanis, N., (2003), 
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Davis, D. R., & Weinstein, D. E., (2002), Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of 
Economic Activity, American Economic Review, vol. 95, no. 2, pp. 1269-1289.
Deininger, K., Byerlee, D., Lindsay, J., Norton, A., Harris, S., & Stickler, M., (2011), Rising Global 
Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? , Washington, D.C.
Demsetz, H., (1967), Toward a Thoery of Property Rights, American Economic Review: Papers, 
pp. 347-358.
Domingues, P., (2011), A Database on the Mozambican Civil War, Peace Economics, Peace 
Science and Public Policy, vol. 17, no. 1.
Ellickson, R. C., (1993), Property in Land, Yale Law Journal, vol. 102, pp. 1322-1335; 1341-1344.
Estabrook, B., (2011), Biofuels, Land and Food Insecurity: A Mozambique Case Study, 
unpublished thesis Type, University of San Diego, San Diego.
Humphreys, M., (2003), Economics and Violent Conflict, Cambridge, MA.
Humphreys, M., (2005), Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the 
Mechanisms, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4.
Krause, J., (2010), Social Resilience in Conflict-Affected Areas of Limited Statehood, Geneva.
12   Topher McDougal and Raul Caruso 
McDougal, T. L., & Caruso, R., (2012), The Ghost of War in Post-Conflict Development Policy: The 
Case of Agricultural Concessions in Mozambique, in paper presented at 12th Annual Jan 
Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference, Berlin: 25 June, 2012.
Miguel, E., Saiegh, S. M., & Satyanath, S., (2011), Civil War Exposure and Violence, Economics 
and Politics, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 59-73.
Oxfam International, (2007), Biofueling Poverty: Why the EU Renewable Fuel Target May be 
Disastrous for Poor People, Boston.
Reno, W., (1997), African Weak States and Commercial Alliances, African Affairs, vol. 96, pp. 
165-185.
Reno, W., (1999), Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Reno, W., (2003), Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict 
in Sierra Leone, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, pp. 44-66.
Sambanis, N., (2002), A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative 
Literature on Civil War, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 215-243.
Schut, M., Slingerland, M., & Locke, A., (2010), Biofuel Developments in Mozambique: Update 
and Analysis of Policy, Potential and Reality, Energy Policy, vol. 38, pp. 5151-5165.
Ver Hoef, J. M., & Boveng, P. L., (2007), Quasi-Poisson Vs. Negative Binomial Regression: How 
Should We Model Overdispersed Count Data?, Ecology, vol. 88, no. 11, pp. 2766–2772.
Weinstein, J., (2005), Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative 
Perspective, Working Paper No. 57, Stanford.
Woolcock, M., (1998), Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical 
Synthesis and Policy Framework, Theory and Society, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 151-208.
